This paper addresses the issue of endogenizing the equilibrium solution when a private -domestic or foreign -…rm competes in the quantities with a public, welfare maximizing …rm.
Introduction
There are several important markets in which public …rms compete with a small number of private ones. Examples include the banking industry in several countries (postal banks in UK, Germany, Italy, New Zealand), as well as TV broadcasting in most of the developed countries. Moreover, health care services and insurance, transportation, energy, overnight delivery (also in the US) are usually provided by state-owned enterprises in competition with private …rms. In industrial organization the term mixed oligopolies has been used to describe such imperfectly competitive markets.
Theoretical literature began to devote closer attention to mixed oligopolies in the eighties of last century when a privatization wave started in several industrialized countries and soon extended to transition and developing economies. The aim of these works was to characterize the mixed oligopoly equilibria and to study the welfare e¤ect of privatization by adapting the standard oligopoly models to the presence of welfare maximizing …rms. Results and policy prescriptions turned out to crucially rely on the type of competition assumed (in quantity competition, for example, Cournot or Stackelberg games). In de Fraja and Delbono (1989) it is shown that if a Stackelberg game with public leadership is played, privatization cannot improve welfare absent e¢ ciency gains; on the contrary, under Cournot competition, this may occur.
In another paper Beato and Mas-Colell (1984) show that welfare may be higher when the public …rm is the follower than when it is the leader in a Stackelberg game. In this way they provided an argument against the standard view of the so-called Second-Best literature (see for example Rees, 1984; and Bös, 1986 ) that claimed the suboptimality of the marginal-cost pricing rule. 1 In the last decade greater attention has been devoted to international mixed oligopolies, in which a domestic public …rm competes with foreign private …rm(s). 2 Again, results and policy prescriptions over privatization depend on the type of competition assumed, either simultaneous-move (Cournot) or sequential (Stackelberg) games.
More recently, a new trend has emerged, based on the idea that the order of play should result from the players' timing decisions. In many economic situations, in fact, it is often more reasonable to assume that …rms choose not only what action to take, but also when to take it. 3 The aim of the present paper is to contribute to this literature identifying the endogenous timing equilibria of a mixed duopoly quantity game where a private -domestic or foreign -…rm competes with a public, welfare maximizing …rm. We use the model of endogenous timing with observable delay developed by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) . In their model, a preplay stage is added to the duopoly game; in this stage players simultaneously decide whether to move early or late in the basic duopoly game. At the end of this stage, timing decisions are revealed and then the basic game is played according to these announcements: if both choose the same timing, simultaneous game is then played; if timing decisions are di¤erent, sequential play under perfect information -with the order of moves as decided by the players -occurs. As a consequence, the subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of the extended game endogenously determines the relevant equilibrium concept for the basic game.
Our main result is that Cournot competition never arises as the equilibrium of the mixed duopoly game when both …rms are active on the market.
We provide su¢ cient conditions for the emergence of public and/or private leadership Stackelberg equilibria in a comprehensive characterization of the mixed duopoly quantity game. We consider the cases in which the private competitor is either domestic or foreign, and the possible strategic complementarity and substitutability.
A domestic mixed duopoly di¤ers from an international one since private …rm's pro…ts are not included in the public …rm's objective function in the latter case.
We show that when quantities are strategic substitute for both …rms (i.e. best-response correspondences are downward sloping) the Stackelberg equilibria with both private and public leadership arise as the SPE of the endogenous timing game. 4 A su¢ cient condition to have downward sloping best-response correspondence for the private …rm is the log-concavity of the (inverse) demand function. For the public …rm, the best-response correspondence is always downward sloping in a domestic duopoly, while a necessary and su¢ cient condition for this to occur in an international duopoly is the convexity of the demand function. Note that these conditions hold true regardless of the cost functions of the two …rms.
Our results have to be contrasted with those obtained in the private duopoly framework. Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) and Amir and Grilo (1999) show that Cournot solution is the general case when quantities are strategic substitute for both …rms, giving theoretical support to the general preference for Cournot over Stackelberg games in the private oligopoly setting.
The main di¤erence lies in the fact that the public …rm's objective is generally increasing in private …rm's output, while the contrary is true for private …rms.
As a consequence, under strategic substitutability for both …rms, the public …rm's output when Stackelberg leader is smaller than the one in a simultaneousmove game. The private …rm then prefers to be follower than Cournot player and public leadership Pareto dominates any Cournot equilibrium. The same is true for private leadership: in fact, the private …rm produces more when Stackelberg leader then under Cournot competition and the public …rm prefers to be follower than simultaneous player.
When the reaction correspondence of the private …rm is increasing while strategic substitutability holds for the public …rm, private leadership is the unique SPE of the endogenous timing game in both domestic and international duopoly. 5 In this case Pareto dominance of private leadership over Cournot competition is again veri…ed, while public leadership dominance is no longer true. In fact, in order to have a larger private production with respect to simultaneous-move game, the public leader produces more than under Cournot competition and the private …rm's pro…ts are reduced. Private …rm has then a dominant strategy to move early and the best timing response of the public …rm is to move late.
In an international mixed duopoly a third case may occur. If the demand function is concave, the best-response correspondence of the public …rm is increasing while the private …rm's one is decreasing. As a result, the Pareto dominance of the public leadership over Cournot competition holds while the private leadership solution does not Pareto dominate the simultaneous equilibria. The latter is due to the fact that private …rm reduces its production when it is Stackelberg leader with respect to the Cournot solutions in order to induce a contraction in the public …rm's production. Then the public …rm always prefers to move early in order to avoid private leadership and public leadership emerges as the unique SPE of the endogenous timing game.
From a methodological point of view, we make large use of the basic results of the theory of supermodular games. 6 These are also called games with strategic complementarities and are characterized by the monotonicity of the best responses to rival's action. The advantages of using this approach are that no concavity assumptions are needed and nevertheless existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria is guaranteed. Moreover we can deal with multiplicity of equilibria since they can be preference-ranked for both private and public …rms.
The present paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model, the solution concept for the endogenous timing and the basic concepts of the supermodularity approach. Section 3 provides the results for a domestic mixed duopoly, while Section 4 contains the analysis of an international mixed duopoly. Section 5 brie ‡y summarizes the conclusions. All the proofs of Lemmas and Theorems are collected in the Appendix.
The model
In this paper we consider a market in which one private, pro…t maximizing …rm competes with a public …rm that maximizes domestic welfare. These …rms, labeled respectively 1 and 0, compete in quantities and their products are perfect substitutes. The market inverse demand function is P ( ); and the two cost functions are C 1 (q 1 ) and C 0 (q 0 ). The two …rms'pro…t functions are then
and consumer surplus is
Since the public …rm's objective function is social welfare, it depends on whether the private …rm is domestic or foreign. We shall analyze the two cases separately. If the private …rm is domestic, then the public …rm will maximize
If the private …rm is foreign, the public …rm's objective will be
We de…ne a mixed-market Cournot equilibrium as a pair of (nonnegative) quantities q N 0 ; q N 1 such that
Thus, in any mixed-market Cournot equilibrium, each …rm optimally replies to the action of the rival and so q N 0 ; q N 1 must lie on the best-response correspondences of the …rms. The latter are de…ned in the standard way:
We denote the set of mixed-market Cournot equilibria of the (mixed) duopoly by N .
A Stackelberg equilibrium of this game corresponds to the subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of a two stage game of perfect information in which the second mover (follower) chooses an action after having observed the action of the …rst mover (leader). A strategy for the leader is to pick a quantity q i 0 and a strategy for the follower is j (q i ), where j ( ) is a mapping from the domain of q i to the domain of q j . Assuming that …rm 0 is the leader, a Stackelberg equilibrium of this mixed duopoly game with public leadership is then a pair q l 0 ; 1 ( ) such that
while a Stackelberg equilibrium with private leadership is a pair 0 ( ) ; q l 1 such that 1 0 q l 1 ; q l 1 1 ( 0 (q 1 ) ; q 1 ) and W 0 q l 1 ; q l 1 W q 0 ; q l 1 8 q 0 ; q 1 0:
In other words, a Stackelberg equilibrium imposes that: (i) the strategy of the second mover is a single valued selection from his best-response correspondence; and (ii) the …rst mover chooses an action that maximizes her objective given the anticipation of the rival's reaction. Then, a Stackelberg equilibrium with public leadership is a pair q l 0 ; q f 1 with q f 1 2 r 1 q l 0 and q l 0 2 arg max q0 0 W (q 0 ; r 1 (q 0 )), while a Stackelberg equilibrium with private leadership is a pair q f 0 ; q l 1 with q f 0 2 r 0 q l 1 and q l 1 2 arg max q1 0 1 (r 0 (q 1 ) ; q 1 ). We denote the set of Stackelberg equilibria with public and private leadership by S 0 and S 1 respectively. The aim of this paper is to identify the appropriate sequencing of moves in a mixed duopoly game. We investigate how the choice between simultaneous (Nash) and sequential (Stackelberg) games and the assignment of leader and follower roles in the latter case endogenously arise. To this end, we adopt the simple model of extended game with observable delay due to Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) .
In this model, a preplay stage is added to the duopoly game. In this stage players simultaneously decide whether to move early or late in the basic duopoly game. At the end of this stage, timing decisions are revealed and then the basic game is played according to these announcements: if both choose the same timing, simultaneous game is then played; while, if timing decisions are di¤erent, sequential play under perfect information -with the order of moves as decided by the players -occurs. As a consequence, the subgame perfect equilibrium of the extended game endogenously determines the relevant equilibrium concept for the basic game. In …gure 1 the game tree of the extended game with observable delay of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) is depicted.
The following Proposition summarizes the results of the Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) model adapting it to the mixed duopoly setting. It characterizes the SPE of the extended game, that is a pair of timing announcements and the relevant equilibrium for the basic game. For the time being, we have to assume that leadership payo¤s are strictly larger than any mixed Nash payo¤ and that all equilibria exist. In next Sections we de…ne conditions for existence of equilibria in the two cases of domestic and foreign private …rm, and show that in fact leader's payo¤s are always larger than Nash payo¤ when both …rms produces positive quantities. 7
Proposition 1 Consider a mixed duopoly quantity game for which Nash and Stackelberg equilibria with both order of moves exist. Assume that both players always prefer to be a Stackelberg leader than a simultaneous player, then the following propositions apply to the set of (pure strategy) subgame-perfect equilibria of the extended game: i) if for each …rm, its Stackelberg follower payo¤ is lower than its least preferred simultaneous play payo¤ , then in any SPE of the extended game both …rms decide to move early and mixed-market Cournot equilibrium is the relevant equilibrium concept for the basic game;
ii) if each …rm's Stackelberg follower payo¤ is strictly larger than its most preferred simultaneous play payo¤ , in any SPE of the extended game …rms play sequentially and both public and private leadership are equilibria of the basic game;
iii) if …rm i's Stackelberg follower payo¤ is strictly larger than its most preferred simultaneous play payo¤ and if …rm j's Stackelberg follower payo¤ is lower than its least preferred mixed Nash payo¤ , then in any SPE of the extended game …rm j moves early, …rm i moves late and j-leadership is the relevant equilibrium of the basic game.
Proof. The proof of this Proposition follows directly from Theorems II, III and IV in Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) .
The intuition behind these results is the following. Given that each …rm prefers to be a leader than to be a simultaneous player, if simultaneous play payo¤ is higher than follower payo¤, moving early is a dominant strategy. But if follower payo¤ is larger than any simultaneous play payo¤, there is no dominant strategy: when the other player moves early the …rm prefers to move late and vice versa. This reasoning explains the three possible results listed in Proposition 1.
Throughout the paper we assume the following.
Standard Assumptions:
i) the inverse demand function P ( ) is twice continuously di¤erentiable and positive (in the relevant range) with P 0 ( ) < 0 and lim x!1 P (x) = 0.
ii) the cost functions C 0 ( ) and C 1 ( ) are strictly increasing and twice continuously di¤erentiable with C i (0) = 0 8i = 0; 1.
Under these standard assumptions the action sets of the …rms are compact since …rms will never …nd it pro…table to produce quantities larger than some bound (that depends on the demand and cost functions). The latter is due to the fact that price is strictly decreasing to 0 and marginal costs are strictly positive. As a consequence, there exists a k i such that the outputs (k i ; 1) are strictly dominated strategies for …rm i = 0; 1. We will relax the assumption on strictly increasing costs only to analyze the case of nondecreasing best-response of the private …rm.
In this work we invoke the results of the theory of supermodular games and so we need conditions on the primitives such that the players' best responses are monotonic in rivals'actions.
Novshek (1985) shows that if a function F (x; y) has the Increasing Di¤ erence Property (Decreasing Di¤ erence Property) it is strictly supermodular (strictly submodular).
Milgrom and Shannon (1994) show that every function
So, either (7) or (8) imply that the best-response correspondences of the …rms are increasing (decreasing). The two are di¤erent since Property (7) is a cardinal property, while Property (8) is an ordinal property.
3 Endogenous timing in mixed duopoly with a domestic private …rm
In this section we consider the case in which the private …rm is domestic, so that a social welfare maximizing public …rm includes private pro…ts in its own objective, as de…ned in equation (3). We prove that (simultaneous-move) Nash equilibrium never arises as SPE of the endogenous timing game as long as it does not coincide with Stackelberg (Theorems 7 and 9).
Our results crucially relies on the e¤ect of rival's action on the objective of the …rms. While the private …rm's pro…ts are strictly decreasing in the public …rm quantity, welfare is nonmonotonic in the output of the private …rm. Nonetheless, as long as price is higher than the private …rm's marginal cost, welfare is increasing in the private …rm's output. Indeed:
In the following Lemmas we state su¢ cient conditions for monotonicity of best responses when the private …rm is domestic.
Lemma 2 Under the standard assumptions, any selection of the public …rm's best-response correspondence r 0 (q 1 ) is nonincreasing. Moreover the minimal selection r 0 ( ) , min r 0 ( ) is strictly decreasing for every q 1 0 such that r 0 (q 1 ) > 0.
Lemma 3 In addition to the standard assumptions:
(a) Assume that either
hold. Then every selection of the private …rm's best-response correspondence r 1 (q 0 ) is nonincreasing and the maximal selection r 1 ( ) , max r 1 ( ) is strictly decreasing for every q 0 0 such that r 1 (q 0 ) > 0;
(b) Assume that C 1 (q 1 ) = 0 8q 1 and P ( ) is strongly log-convex everywhere, i.e. P (x) P 00 (x) P 02 (x) > 0. Then every selection of the best-response correspondence r 1 (q 0 ) is increasing.
In what follows we …rst characterize the case in which the best-response correspondences are nonincreasing for both …rms. In Lemma 4 we show that the set of Nash equilibria is nonempty. Moreover, since we are proving that the conditions of point ii) and iii) of Proposition 1 occur, we characterize the most preferred mixed Nash equilibrium for both …rms.
Lemma 4 Under the assumptions of point (a) in Lemma 3, the mixed duopoly quantity game is a supermodular game. Hence, the set N of pure strategy Nash equilibria is nonempty and includes the point q 0 ; q 1 where the private …rm produces its highest output and the public …rm produces the lowest output in the set N . Moreover, q 0 ; q 1 is the Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium and lies on r 0 (q 1 ) and on r 1 (q 0 ), the minimal and maximal best-response selections of the public and the private …rm, respectively.
In the next Lemma we prove the existence result for Stackelberg with both public and private leadership.
Lemma 5 Under the assumptions of point (a) in Lemma 3, the set S 0 of Stackelberg equilibria with the public …rm acting as leader and the set S 1 of Stackelberg equilibria with the private …rm's leadership are not empty. Moreover, every q l 0 ; q f 1 2 S 0 must lay on r 1 ( ) and every (q f 0 ; q l 1 ) 2 S 1 must lay on r 0 ( ). So the sets of the Stackelberg equilibria can be de…ned in the following way 8
Hence, all the points in S 0 and S 1 give the same payo¤ to the leader.
The two previous Lemmas have shown that the most preferred Nash equilibrium lies on the same selections of the best-response correspondences as the Stackelberg equilibria. Given this property, we provide conditions under which the leader payo¤ in the Stackelberg games are strictly larger than in the most preferred Nash equilibrium. In the following Lemma we prove that this is true whenever the most preferred Nash equilibrium is interior.
Lemma 6 Under the assumptions of point (a) in Lemma 3, if q 0 ; q 1 is interior (i.e., both …rms produce strictly positive output), then the Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium q 0 ; q 1 = 2 fS 0 ; S 1 g. So, the payo¤ of the leader in any Stackelberg equilibria is strictly larger than in any Nash equilibria.
The following Theorem characterizes the SPE of the extended game when public and private quantities are strategic substitutes for both …rms.
Theorem 7 Under the assumptions of point (a) in Lemma 3, simultaneous play never arises as a SPE of the extended game if the Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium does not coincide with Stackelberg equilibria. The latter occurs only on the boundary when monopolist equilibria arise.
The intuition for this result is the following. If the public …rm is the leader, it will produce less than in any Nash equilibrium. The reason is that in any Nash equilibrium the public …rm does not take into account the strategic (negative) e¤ects of its action on private …rm's production. So, when this e¤ect is taken into account, the public leader will reduce its quantity (and the private …rm will increase its production) given that welfare is increasing in private …rm's output on the private …rm best-response correspondence. As a result, private pro…ts are larger under public leadership than under simultaneous competition.
It is not possible to derive a similar result for the public …rm since welfare is not monotonic in rival's output out of the private …rm's best response. However, it is clear that Nash equilibrium cannot occur as a SPE of the endogenous timing game. In fact, in the case the public …rm has a dominant strategy to move …rst, there is a unique SPE entailing public leadership since the conditions of point iii) of Proposition 1 occur. If the public …rm has no dominant strategy, the two Stackelberg equilibria are both SPE of the extended game, given that the conditions of point ii) of Proposition 1 hold.
In the proof of Theorem 7 we show that when the Pareto dominant (simultaneousgame) Nash equilibrium is on the boundary it is the monopolist outcome and coincides with the Stackelberg equilibrium.
The next Theorem analyzes the case in which the private …rm's reaction correspondence is nondecreasing in rival's output. Here we cannot invoke the results of the theory of supermodular games, since the two reaction correspondences slope in opposite directions, implying that it is not possible to re-order action sets in such a way that both …rms' reaction correspondences slope upward.
As a consequence, to guarantee existence of Nash equilibria in this case, we need to revert to the standard approach for establishing existence of purestrategy Nash equilibrium, which requires strict quasi-concavity of each …rm's objective function in own output to ensure single-valuedness and continuity of the …rms'reaction functions. This is done via the following su¢ cient conditions.
Lemma 8 Under the standard assumptions, the following su¢ cient conditions hold:
(a) The private …rm's pro…t function is quasi-concave in own output if 1=P ( ) is a convex function, i.e. if P ( )P 00 ( ) 2(P 0 ) 2 ( ) < 0 (b) The public …rm's pro…t function is strictly concave in own output if P 0 (q 0 + q 1 ) C 00 0 (q 0 ) < 0:
Proof. The proof of part (a) is in Amir (2003, Appendix) , while the proof of part (b) is straightforward.
We consider only the case in which there exists an interior Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 9 Under the assumptions of point (b) in Lemma 3, the private …rm's reaction correspondence slopes upward and the reaction correspondence of the public …rm slopes downward. Under the conditions of Lemma 8 the …rms' reaction functions are continuous and single valued. Assume in addition that an interior Nash equilibrium exists. Then, private leadership is the unique SPE of the extended game.
In this case, di¤erently from the one analyzed in Theorem 7, the strategic e¤ect of public …rm's action on private …rm's production is positive. So, taking into account this e¤ect, the public …rm leader will produce more than in the Nash equilibrium. As a consequence, the private …rm's pro…ts are smaller under public leadership than in a simultaneous play equilibrium; then the private …rm has a dominant strategy to move …rst.
It is easy to show that the public …rm prefers the private leadership to the Nash equilibrium. In fact, since private …rm's pro…ts are strictly decreasing in public …rm's production, the private leader will induce a reduction in public …rm's quantity by producing more than in the Nash equilibrium. A larger private production increases welfare, since the latter is strictly increasing in private …rm's quantity. 9 As a result the public …rm strictly prefers to be follower than to be simultaneous player. So, the conditions of point iii) of Proposition 1 hold. domestic welfare, as de…ned in equation (4). The public …rm's objective is strictly increasing in the rival's output under the standard assumptions since @W (q 0 ; q 1 ) @q 1 = q 1 P 0 (q 0 + q 1 ) > 0:
This result simpli…es the analysis with respect to the case of domestic public …rm and allows us to fully characterize the equilibria of the endogenous timing game. Nonetheless, the central result of the previous Section is con…rmed: simultaneous play never occurs in any SPE of the endogenous timing game. The next Lemma states su¢ cient conditions for monotonicity of the public …rm's best-response correspondence, while Lemma 3 still holds for the private …rm.
Lemma 10 Under the standard assumptions:
(a) Any selection of the public …rm's best-response correspondence r 0 (q 1 ) is nonincreasing as long as P 00 (x) > 0 8x 0. Moreover the minimal selection r 0 (q 1 ) is strictly decreasing for every q 1 0 such that r 0 (q 1 ) > 0.
(b) Any selection of public …rm's best-response correspondence r 0 (q 1 ) is nondecreasing as long as P 00 (x) < 0 8x 0. Moreover the minimal selection r 0 (q 1 ) is strictly increasing for every q 1 0 such that r 0 (q 1 ) > 0.
Note that it never occurs that both …rms have nondecreasing best-response correspondences. In fact, by point (b) of Lemma 3, P 00 ( ) > 0 is a necessary condition to have a nondecreasing private …rm's best response. But P 00 ( ) > 0 implies that the public …rm's best response is downward sloping.
In what follows, we …rst characterize the case in which both reaction correspondences are decreasing. As in the previous Section, this is a su¢ cient condition for the game to be supermodular and to have existence results. When the game is not supermodular we need additional assumptions on the primitives to secure existence of equilibria.
Lemma 11 Under the assumptions of point (a) of Lemma 3 and point (a) of Lemma 10, the mixed duopoly quantity game is a supermodular game. Hence, the set N of pure strategy Nash equilibria is nonempty and includes the point q 0 ; q 1 where the private …rm produces its highest output and the public …rm produces the lowest output in the set N . Moreover, q 0 ; q 1 is the Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium and lies on r 0 ( ) and on r 1 ( ).
Proof. See proof of Lemma 4.
Lemma 12 Under the assumptions of point (a) of Lemma 3 and point (a) of Lemma 10, the set S 0 of Stackelberg equilibria with the public …rm acting as leader and the set S 1 of Stackelberg equilibria with the private …rm's leadership are not empty. Moreover, every (q l 0 ; q f 1 ) 2 S 0 must lay on r 1 ( ) and every (q f 0 ; q l 1 ) 2 S 1 must lay on r 0 ( ). So, the sets of the Stackelberg equilibria can be de…ned in the following way S 0 = arg max q0 0 fW (q 0 ; q 1 ) : (q 0 ; q 1 ) 2 gr r 1 ( )g S 1 = arg max q1 0 f 1 (q 0 ; q 1 ) : (q 0 ; q 1 ) 2 gr r 0 ( )g Hence, all the points in S 0 and S 1 give the same payo¤ to the leader. Proof. See the proof of Lemma 5.
As in the previous Section, we show with the following Lemma, that leader payo¤s of both …rms are strictly larger than the simultaneous play payo¤ in the Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium as long as the latter is interior.
Lemma 13 Under the assumptions of point (a) of Lemma 3 and point (a) of Lemma 10, if q 0 ; q 1 is interior, the Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium q 0 ; q 1 = 2 fS 0 ; S 1 g. So, the payo¤ of the leader in any Stackelberg equilibria is strictly larger than in any Nash equilibria.
Proof. See proof of Lemma 6.
The following Theorem characterizes the SPE of the extended game when public and private quantities are strategic substitutes for both …rms. The next Theorem analyzes the case in which the private …rm's reaction correspondence is nondecreasing in rival's output. As in the previous Section, the game is not supermodular. We need again to assume quasi-concavity of welfare in public …rm's quantity.
We consider only the case in which there exists an interior Nash equilibrium. To see that welfare is concave in own output, note that @ 2 W @q 2 0 = (P 0 C 00 0 ) q 1 P 00 < 0 since it is the sum of two negative terms (here, P 00 > 0 by log-convexity). When the private …rm is foreign, the public …rm may have a reaction correspondence that slopes upward, as proved by point (b) of Lemma 10. As in the previous case, the game is not supermodular and then further assumptions are needed to ensure existence. In the following Theorem we show that public leadership is the unique equilibrium of the extended game.
Theorem 16 Under the assumption of point (b) in Lemma 10, the public …rm best-response correspondence is nondecreasing. Assume that the objectives of both …rms are quasi-concave in their own action and that an interior Nash equilibrium exists. Then public leadership is the unique SPE of the endogenous timing game.
Conclusion
Our main result is that Cournot equilibria are never the endogenous timing equilibrium of the mixed duopoly game as far as both …rms produce positive quantities. If the Pareto dominant Cournot equilibrium is on the boundary, it is also the Stackelberg solution and coincides with the monopolist outcome. Only in this case it is the SPE of the extended game.
When quantities are strategic substitute for both …rms the two Stackelberg equilibria are the (pure strategy) SPE of the endogenous timing game.
When this is not the case, and one …rm has upward sloping best response, then there is a unique equilibrium with this …rm being the leader in the Stackelberg game.
Using the natural and simple endogenous time scheme of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) , our results provide a justi…cation to the use of the Stackelberg notion of equilibrium in mixed duopolies.
If we couple this claim with the results in the private duopoly framework provided by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) and Amir and Grilo (1999) , where the Cournot solution is the general outcome, we gain new insights on the e¤ect of privatization. The change in the objective of the former public …rm is not the sole e¤ect of privatization. In fact, when it is more reasonable to assume that …rms choose not only what action to take, but also when to take them, also the timing of the game changes. Since the Stackelberg equilibria arising as SPE in the mixed duopoly dominates Cournot solutions in terms of welfare, any positive e¤ect of privatization derived assuming a given timing of the game is weakened.
A clearer assessment of the e¤ect of privatization, the consideration of more than one private …rm, and the introduction of re…nements in order to select one of the equilibria in case of multiplicity are the natural extensions of this work.
Appendix
This Appendix includes all the proofs of the paper.
Proof of Lemma 2. Since the public …rm maximizes total welfare as de…ned in equation (3), its objective has DDP since @ 2 W (q 0 ; q 1 ) @q 0 @q 1 = P 0 (q 0 + q 1 ) < 0:
So, under the standard assumptions, any selection of the best-response correspondence of the public …rm is nonincreasing. Now, take the minimal selection r 0 (q 1 ). For every q 1 0 such that r 0 (q 1 ) > 0, the following …rst-order condition holds: P (r 0 (q 1 ) + q 1 ) C 0 0 (r 0 (q 1 )) = 0:
Di¤erentiating (12) with respect to q 1 we have P 0 (r 0 (q 1 ) + q 1 ) + [P 0 (r 0 (q 1 ) + q 1 ) C 00 0 (r 0 (q 1 ))] r 0 0 (q 1 ) = 0
where r 0 0 (q 1 ) is a Dini derivate. 10 Since by our Standard Assumption P 0 ( ) < 0, equation (13) does not hold if r 0 0 (q 1 ) = 0. So, the minimal selection of the public …rm best-response correspondence is strictly decreasing.
Proof of Lemma 3. a) Following Novshek (1985) , the private …rm's objective has the Decreasing Di¤erence Property when @ 2 1 (q 0 ; q 1 ) @q 0 @q 1 = P 0 (q 0 + q 1 ) + q 1 P 00 (q 0 + q 1 ) < 0 8q 0 ; q 1 0 which is equivalent to
while a su¢ cient condition for the dual Strict Single-Crossing Property is
as de…ned in Amir (1996) . If one of these conditions holds, then any selection of the private …rm's best-response correspondence is nonincreasing. Considering the maximal selection r 1 (q 0 ), the following …rst-order condition holds for every q 0 0 such that r 1 (q 0 ) > 0:
P (q 0 + r 1 (q 0 )) + r 1 (q 0 ) P 0 (q 0 + r 1 (q 0 )) C 0 1 (r 1 (q 0 )) = 0:
Di¤erentiating with respect to q 0 , we have (r 0 1 ( ) is a Dini derivate): P 0 ( ) (1 + 2r 0 1 ( )) + r 1 ( ) (1 + r 0 1 ( )) P 00 ( ) C 00 1 ( ) r 0 1 ( ) = 0:
We want to show that the r 1 (q 0 ) is strictly decreasing; so we have to rule out the possibility that r 0 1 (q 0 ) = 0 in the interior. Setting for contradiction that r 0 1 (b q 0 ) = 0 for some b q 0 , equation (17) becomes:
that contradicts the DDP de…ned in (14). We want to show that also the dual SSCP is incompatible with (18). Indeed, from the …rst-order condition (16) we get an expression for r 1 (q 0 ):
and substituting it into (18) we get:
) > 0 by the …rst-order condition, equation (19) contradicts either log-concavity of P ( ) or the standard assumption that C 1 ( ) is strictly increasing. So, r 1 (q 0 ) is strictly decreasing when interior. b) Since the production costs of the private …rm are zero, its objective reduces to q 1 P (q 0 + q 1 ). Given that log P ( ) is convex by assumption, it follow that the objective is logsupermodular, i.e. @ 2 log q 1 P (q 0 + q 1 ) @q 0 @q 1 = P (q 0 + q 1 ) P 00 (q 0 + q 1 ) P 02 (q 0 + q 1 ) P 2 (q 0 + q 1 ) > 0:
So, every selection of the private …rm best-response correspondence is nondecreasing.
Proof of Lemma 4. Reversing the natural order of the public …rm action set, the game becomes a supermodular game with e¤ective strategy set [0; k 0 ] [0; k 1 ] (see Vives, 1990) . By Tarski's …xed point theorem the set N is not empty and has a largest Nash equilibrium in the new order, which is clearly q 0 ; q 1 . 11 This is the Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium since the objectives of both …rms are increasing in the other player's action (in the new order). In fact, according to Milgrom and Roberts (1990, Theorem 7) the largest equilibrium is the most preferred Nash equilibrium by both …rms. 12 We now prove that q 0 ; q 1 lies on r 0 ( ) and on r 1 ( ). By contradiction, if q 0 ; q 1 is not on r 0 ( ) and r 1 ( ) the map (q 0 ; q 1 ) ! (r 0 (q 1 ) ; r 1 (q 0 )) which is nondecreasing (in the new order) would have a largest (in the new order) …xed point (q 0 ;q 1 ). This point belongs of course to the set N , contradicting the extremal nature of q 0 ; q 1 .
Proof of Lemma 5.
To show that S 0 and S 1 are not empty, note that the e¤ective action space is a compact set and the payo¤ functions are jointly continuous, so that the follower's best response correspondence has a closed graph. Then Stackelberg equilibria exist (see Hellwig and Leininger, 1987) . Now we show that every (q l 0 ; q f 1 ) 2 S 0 lies on r 1 ( ). Since the best response correspondence of the follower r 1 ( ) has a closed graph, it has a maximum selection r 1 ( ) that is lower semi-continuous and left continuous. By contradiction assume that there is a (q l 0 ; q f 1 ) 2 S 0 such that q f 1 < r 1 q l 0 . By point (a) in Lemma 3 every selection of r 1 ( ) is nonincreasing; hence the set of points at which r 1 ( ) is multivalued coincides with the set of points at which r 1 q l 0 is discontinuous, which is a countable set. So, by the contradiction hypothesis, r 1 ( ) is multivalued at q l 0 . For a su¢ ciently small ; the leader can choose q l 0 for which r 1 q l 0 is single valued and is strictly higher than q f 1 . Then, W q l 0 ; r 1 q l 0 > W q l 0 ; q f 1 since W (q 0 ; q 1 ) is continuous in q 0 and strictly increasing in q 1 8q 1 2 r 0 ( ). 13 This contradicts the hypotesis that (q l 0 ; q f 1 ) = 2 r 1 ( ) is a Stackelberg equilibrium. As a consequence, S 0 = arg max q0 0 fW (q 0 ; r 1 (q 0 ))g and all the points in S 0 must yield the same payo¤.
The same reasoning applies to the proof that (q f 0 ; q l 1 ) 2 S 1 must lay on r 0 ( ) and that every (q f 0 ; q l 1 ) 2 S 1 yields the same payo¤.
Proof of Lemma 6. If q 0 ; q 1 is interior, the following …rst-order conditions for public and private …rms must hold: @W q 0 ; q 1 @q 0 = 0 @ 1 q 0 ; q 1 @q 1 = 0 1 2 More precisely, W (q 0 ; q 1 ) is increasing in q 1 as far as p(q 0 ; q 1 ) C 0 1 (q 1 ) 0. However, Theorem 7 of Milgrom and Roberts (1990) requires that W (0; q 1 ) being increasing in q 1 , that is always true 8q 1 2 [0; k 1 ].
1 3 For every q 0 such that r 1 ( ) > 0 the following …rst order condition for the private …rm must hold: P (q 0 ; q 1 ) + q 1 P 0 (q 0 ; q 1 ) C 0 1 (q 1 ) = 0. This implies that P (q 0 ; q 1 ) C 0 1 (q 1 ) > 0 and that W (q 0 ; r 1 (q 0 )) is always strictly increasing in q 1 . If q f 0 ; q l 1 2 S 1 is also interior, then the following …rst-order condition for the private leader must hold:
where r 0 0 q l 1 is again a Dini derivate. 14 Since @ 1(q 0 ;q 1 ) @q0 < 0 by equation (9) and r 0 0 q l 1 < 0 in the interior by point (a) of Lemma 3, then
in any interior point and the fact that q 0 ; q 1 6 2 S 1 directly follows. If q f 0 ; q l 1 is not interior, then the conclusion follows from the interiority of q 0 ; q 1 .
Considering public leadership, if q l 0 ; q f 1 2 S 0 is also interior, the following …rst-order condition for the public leader must hold:
Since by Lemma 5 the point q l 0 ; q f 1 lies on r 1 q l 0 , the …rst-order condition of the private …rm -equation (16) in the proof of point (a) of Lemma 3 -holds; then price is strictly above the marginal cost in q l 0 ; q f 1 . It follows that @W q l 0 ; q f 1 @q 1 > 0:
Being q l 0 ; q f 1 interior, r 0 1 q l 0 < 0 and we have the result that @W q l 0 ; q f 1 @q 0 > 0:
This implies that q 0 ; q 1 6 2 S 0 . If q l 0 ; q f 1 is not interior, then the conclusion follows from the interiority of q 0 ; q 1 .
Proof of Theorem 7. We …rst consider the case in which the Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium is interior.
By Lemma 6 we know that both public and private …rms prefer any Stackelberg leader's outcome to simultaneous play most preferred equilibrium. This result implies that:
where the …rst inequality derives from the property of Stackelberg equilibria and the second from the property of Nash equilibria. Since
it follows that q f 1 > q 1 since W ( ) is increasing in q 1 for every q 1 q f 1 . By point (a) of Lemma 3 r 1 ( ) is strictly decreasing and since both (q l 0 ; q f 1 ) and (q 0 ; q 1 ) lie on r 1 ( ), then:
As a consequence, we can rank private …rm's pro…ts; in fact,
where the …rst inequality comes from the fact that q f 1 is a best response for the private …rm to q l 0 and the second is due to the private …rm's objective being strictly decreasing in the public …rm's output.
So, the private …rm strictly prefers any Stackelberg follower payo¤ to the best Nash payo¤. This is enough to rule out simultaneous play from the SPE of the extended game. In fact, if public …rm's follower payo¤ is larger than the best Nash equilibrium payo¤, then both sequential play are the equilibria of the extended game. If public …rm prefers any Nash equilibrium to private leadership equilibrium, then public leadership is the unique equilibrium. If some Nash equilibria are preferred by the public …rm to the private leadership and some are not, then either public leadership or both sequential play are equilibria of the extended game.
It is possible to show that a su¢ cient condition for public …rm's follower payo¤ being higher than the best Nash payo¤ is C 0 0 (r 0 (q 1 )) > C 0 1 (q 1 ) 8q 1 2 q 1 ; q l 1 . So, both …rm would prefer follower payo¤ to the best Nash payo¤ and both Stackelberg equilibria would arise in the SPE of the extended game, according to point ii) of Proposition 1. 15 Assume now that q 0 = 0; i.e., the Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium is on the boundary. Since q 1 is on the maximal selection of the best-response correspondence of the private …rm, q 1 is the monopolist quantity. Moreover, being the objective of the private …rm strictly decreasing in q 0 , q 0 ; q 1 2 S 1 .
It is easy to show that, if there exists a q l 0 ; q f 1 2 S 0 di¤erent from q 0 ; q 1 , then q l 0 > q 0 and q f 1 < q 1 . So:
and private …rm never prefers to be follower than to be in the Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium. It follows that private …rm has a dominant strategy to move early and the unique equilibrium of the game is the private monopolist outcome.
Assume that q 1 = 0. So, q 0 is the public …rm monopolist quantity. Moreover the Nash equilibrium is unique by the de…nition of Pareto dominance. Then, it is possible to show that q 0 ; q 1 2 S 0 and that W q 0 ; q 1 > W q f 0 ; q l 1 8 q f 0 ; q l 1 6 = q 0 ; q 1 . So, the public …rm has a dominant strategy to move …rst and the unique equilibrium of the game is the public monopoly.
Proof of Theorem 9. By quasi-concavity of both objectives the reaction correspondences of both …rms are single-valued and continuous. Moreover the reaction correspondence of the public …rm is strictly decreasing when interior. Hence, the Nash equilibrium q 0 ; q 1 is unique. Since q 0 ; q 1 is interior by assumption, the following inequalities hold:
Then, q f 1 > q 1 . Since q l 0 ; q f 1 and q 0 ; q 1 lie on r 1 , that is strictly increasing in the interior, then it follows that q l 0 > q 0 . As a consequence, we can rank private …rm's payo¤s in the following way:
where the …rst inequality follows from the property of Nash equilibria and the second from the fact that 1 is strictly decreasing in q 0 . Then, the private …rm strictly prefers Nash to public leadership equilibria. Again from the interiority assumptions we can show that for q f 0 ; q l 1 2 S 1 1 q f 0 ; q l 1 > 1 q 0 ; q 1 1 q 0 ; q l 1 :
Hence, q f 0 < q 0 and q l 1 > q 1 by the fact that both points q f 0 ; q l 1 and q 0 ; q 1 lie on r 0 that is strictly decreasing in the interior by Lemma 2. Then we show that:
In fact, the …rst inequality is consequence of q f 0 being best response to q l 1 , and the second follows from the fact that W (q 0 ; q 1 ) is strictly increasing in q 1 because price is above private …rm's marginal cost that are zero.
The conditions of point iii) of Proposition 1 hold and private leadership is the unique SPE of the endogenous timing game.
Proof of Lemma 13.
(a) the private …rm's objective has the Decreasing Di¤erence Property if @ 2 W (q0;q1) @q0@q1 < 0. Since @ 2 W (q 0 ; q 1 ) @q 0 @q 1 = q 1 P 00 (q 0 + q 1 ) a necessary and su¢ cient condition for DDP is P 00 (q 0 + q 1 ) > 0.
For the dual Strict Single Crossing Condition, de…ne:
F (x; t; y) ,
Then:
@F (x; t; y) @x = P (x + y) yP 0 (x + y)
So, the same condition is needed to have DDP and dual SSCP.
(b) Repeating the same steps of the previous point we can show that the condition to have IDP and SSCP is: P 00 (q 0 + q 1 ) < 0.
Proof of Theorem 14. Consider …rst the case in which the Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium is interior. By Lemma 13 we know that both public and private …rm strictly prefer leader's outcome to any simultaneous outcome. The, the following inequalities hold for the public …rm:
where the …rst inequality is due to Lemma 13 and the second derives from q 1 being a best response to q 0 . From the fact that W q l 0 ; q f 1 > W q l 0 ; q 1 it follows that q f 1 > q 1 by welfare being strictly increasing in q 1 . By Lemmas 11 and 12, q l 0 ; q f 1 and q 0 ; q 1 lie on r 1 (q 0 ), that is strictly decreasing in the interior. So, q l 0 < q 0 . As a consequence, private …rm's pro…t in q l 0 ; q f 1 are larger than in q 0 ; q 1 . In fact: 1 q l 0 ; q f 1 1 q l 0 ; q 1 > 1 q 0 ; q 1 where the …rst inequality is due to q f 1 being best response to q l 0 and the second is due to the fact that 1 is strictly decreasing in q 0 . Private …rm, then, prefers any Stackelberg follower equilibria to the best Nash equilibrium.
Analyzing the private leadership equilibria, we know that 1 q f 0 ; q l 1 > 1 q 0 ; q 1 1 q 0 ; q l 1 :
In fact, the …rst inequality is proved in Lemma 13 and the second is due to the property of Nash equilibria. Then, since 1 q f 0 ; q l 1 > 1 q 0 ; q l 1 , q f 0 < q 0 , being private …rm's pro…t strictly decreasing in q 0 . Since both q f 0 ; q l 1 and q 0 ; q 1 lie on r 0 (that is strictly decreasing in the interior), it follows that q l 1 > q 1 . Now we show that W q f 0 ; q l 1 W q 0 ; q l 1 > W q 0 ; q 1 :
The …rst inequality is due to q f 0 being a best response to q l 1 , while the second derives from the fact that W ( ) is strictly decreasing in q 1 . As a result, both …rms prefer to be follower than to be simultaneous player. According to point ii) of Proposition 1 the two Stackelberg equilibria endogenously arise as SPNE of the endogenous timing game.
Assume now that q 0 = 0, so that the Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium entails no production for the public …rm. Hence, q 1 is the monopolist quantity for private …rm. Moreover, since private pro…ts are strictly decreasing in q 0 , and any q f 0 ; q l 1 2 S 1 lies on r 0 (q 1 ), that is strictly decreasing, it follows that q 0 ; q 1 2 S 1 . By the same argument q 0 ; q 1 2 S 0 . Then, q 0 ; q 1 is the unique SPE of the extended game of endogenous timing.
Assume that q 1 = 0. So, q 0 is the public …rm monopolist quantity. Moreover the Nash equilibrium is unique by the de…nition of Pareto dominance. Then, it is possible to show that q 0 ; q 1 2 S 0 and that W q 0 ; q 1 > W q f 0 ; q l 1 8 q f 0 ; q l 1 6 = q 0 ; q 1 . So, public …rm has a dominant strategy to move …rst and the unique equilibrium of the game is the public monopoly.
Proof of Theorem 16. By quasi-concavity of both W ( ) and 1 ( ), the best-response correspondences are single-valued. Moreover r 0 (q 1 ) is strictly increasing and r 1 (q 0 ) is strictly decreasing in the interior. Hence, the Nash equilibrium q 0 ; q 1 is unique. Since q 0 ; q 1 is interior by assumption, the following inequalities hold: W q l 0 ; q f 1 > W q 0 ; q 1 W q l 0 ; q 1 :
Then, q f 1 > q 1 . Since q l 0 ; q f 1 and q 0 ; q 1 lie on r 1 , that is strictly decreasing in the interior, then it follows that q l 0 < q 0 . As a consequence, we can rank private …rm's payo¤s in the following way:
where the …rst inequality follows from the fact that q f 1 is a best response to q l 0 and the second from the fact that 1 is decreasing in q 0 . Then, the private …rm strictly prefers public leadership to Nash equilibrium. From the interiority assumptions we can show that for q f 0 ; q l 1 2 S 1 1 q f 0 ; q l 1 > 1 q 0 ; q 1 1 q 0 ; q l 1
Hence, q f 0 < q 0 and q l 1 < q 1 by the fact that both points q f 0 ; q l 1 and q 0 ; q 1 lie on r 0 that is strictly increasing. Then we show that:
In fact, the …rst inequality follows from the fact that q 0 is best response to q 1 and the second is consequence of W q f 0 ; q 1 being strictly increasing in q 1 for any q 1 < r 1 q f 0 . 16 The conditions of point iii) of Proposition 1 hold and public leadership is the unique SPE of the endogenous timing game.
